From: theory-group-admin@cs.washington.edu
Subject: Talk: Balasubramanian Sivan / Optimal Crowdsourcing Contests / Wed 1/28, 3:30pm / CSE 403
SPEAKER: Balasubramanian Sivan (MSR)
TITLE: Optimal Crowdsourcing Contests
WHEN: Wednesday, 1/28, 3:30pm
WHERE: CSE 403
ABSTRACT:
We study the design and approximation of optimal crowdsourcing
contests. Crowdsourcing contests can be modeled as all-pay auctions because
entrants must exert effort up-front to enter. Unlike all-pay auctions where a
usual design objective would be to maximize revenue, in crowdsourcing contests,
the principal only benefits from the submission with the highest quality. We
give a theory for optimal crowdsourcing contests that mirrors the theory of
optimal auction design. We also compare crowdsourcing contests with more
conventional means of procurement and show that crowdsourcing contests are
constant factor approximations to conventional methods.
Joint work with Shuchi Chawla and Jason Hartline.
From: Abraham D. Flaxman
Subject: FW: Talk: Balasubramanian Sivan / Optimal Crowdsourcing Contests / Wed 1/28, 3:30pm / CSE 403
Sorry I missed this. Jason told me about this project a little while back, and it convinced me to enter a contest. It was more fun than writing a grant proposal, and when it was rejected they gave me a 2nd runner up cash prize…
–Abie
Healthy Algorithms 